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"It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices. There is no limit to human inventiveness in this field."'
The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (TDTPA), as amended by
the Sixty-sixth Texas Legislature, became law on August 27, 1979.' The
amendments were designed to protect consumers against false, misleading, and deceptive business practices, while guarding the interests of hon-

1. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1142, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914), quoted in FTC v. R.F.
Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 312 n.2 (1933).
2. See 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 603, § 10, at 1332 (amendments to Deceptive Trade
Practices--Consumer Protection Act (TDTPA) introduced by Senate Bill 357 and House
Bill 744). The 1979 amendments do not affect "either procedurally or substantively a cause
of action that arose either in whole or in part prior to the effective date of this Act." Id. § 9,
at 1332. Therefore, practioners should keep handy their "pocket part" versions of chapter
17 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code for any cause of action which arose prior to
August 27, 1979. Id. § 9, at 1332.
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est businessmen.8 Critics of the 1979 revisions contend the removal of
mandatory treble damages above one thousand dollars4 and the elimination of private causes of action under the Act's "omnibus clause" 5 have
reduced the deterrent effect of the TDTPA. s Opposition to the revisions
is based upon fear that the amendments will diminish the protection of
consumer rights.7 Critics contend the amendments enable some persons
3. See Debate on S.B. 357 Before the Entire Senate, 66th Tex. Leg. 1-2, 8 (Apr. 4,
1979) (unpublished transcript of Texas Senate proceeding) (amendments needed to bring
balance to marketplace, as pendulum has swung too far away from protecting seller's rights)
[Hereinafter cited as Senate Debate of 4 April 79]; Hearing on S.B. 357 Before the Senate
Economic Development Committee, 66th Tex. Leg. 3 (Mar. 5, 1979) (unpublished transcript
of Texas Senate proceeding) (TDTPA needs to vigorously prosecute culpable misconduct,
not penalize incorrect speech, mistakes, or errors in judgment) [Hereinafter cited as Hearing
on S.B. 357]; Hearing on H.B. 744 Before the House State Affairs Committee, 66th Tex.
Leg. 5, 8 (Feb. 26, 1979) (unpublished transcript of Texas House of Representatives proceeding) (H.B. 744 attempts to treat everyone fairly, not punish innocent as well as guilty)
[Hereinafter cited as Hearing on H.B. 744].
4. Compare 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, sec. 1, § 17.50(b)(1), at 327 (prevailing consumer awarded three times actual damages) with Tax. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1)
(Vernon Supp. 1980) (absent proof of knowledge, only first one thousand dollars actual
damages shall be trebled).
5. "Omnibus Clause" as used herein refers to the language found in 1973 Tex. Gen.
Laws, ch. 143, sec. 1, § 17.46(a), at 323, as amended by TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.46(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980), which provides that "false, misleading, or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are . . . declared [illegal] . . . ." This
language was adopted from section (5)(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976) (FTCA). Under the 1979 TDTPA the "omnibus clause" may only
be utilized by the Consumer Protection Division of the Attorney General's Office. TEx. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
6. See Debate on S.B. 357 Before the Entire Senate, 66th Tex. Leg. 17 (Apr. 10, 1979)
(unpublished transcript of Texas Senate proceeding) (vote for S.B. 357 would encourage
litigation rather than settlement and bury Consumer Protection Act of 1973) [Hereinafter
cited as Senate Debate of 10 April 79]; Hearing on S.B. 357, supra note 3, at 46-48, 54;
O'Gorman, Omnibus Clause and Settlement Procedure 1-2 (1979) (unpublished essay available from the State Bar of Texas) (neither the "omnibus clause" nor mandatory use of
federal precedent by Texas courts available in private cause of action) [Hereinafter cited as
O'Gorman, Omnibus Clause and Settlement Procedure].
7. See Senate Debate of 4 April 79, supra note 3, at 1 (Sen. Schwarz-proposed
amendments to TDTPA "destructive to the principle of honest dealings between tradesmen
and consumers"); Doggett, Damages from Deception-Effect of the 1979 Amendments 1
(1979) (unpublished essay available from author) (S.B. 357's amendments limit counsel's
ability to protect consumers) [Hereinafter cited as Doggett, Damages from Deception];
O'Gorman, Omnibus Clause and Settlement Procedure, supra note 6, at 2 ("prescription
that any unfair act is forbidden by [TDTPA] no longer valid") (TDTPA lost flexibility to
punish unfair practices not on "laundry list"). But cf. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REv. 724, 748 (1972) (discussing harassing consumer recoveries).
"Consistently liberal financial rewards for consumer . . . could yield a lucrative nuisance
value for irresponsible . . . attorneys, . . . [to] impose unreasonable harassment upon business .... " Lovett, State Deceptive. Trade PracticeLegislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 724, 748

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol11/iss4/5

2

McCarthy: An Analysis of the 1979 Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and P

1980]

COMMENTS

to circumvent consumer interests, and have labeled the TDTPA a "Consumer Destruction Act" rather than a "Consumer Protection Act."' Proponents of the 1979 amendments, however, contend the TDTPA has retained its "consumer protection" character,9 providing incentives for
consumers to settle rather than litigate their grievances."0 Texas courts
must now determine whether the revised TDTPA can bring balance to
the Texas marketplace, while continuing to provide efficient and economical methods of protecting consumers from false, misleading, and deceptive practices."
I.

ORIGINS OF STATUTORY CONSUMER REMEDIES IN TEXAS

In 1967 the Texas Interest-Consumer Credit and Consumer Protec(1972); see Hearingon H.B. 744, supra note 3, at 5 (treble damages a hammer in consumer's
hand to force seller to settle knowing he can not win).
8. See Hearing on S.B. 357, supra note 3, at 17; Senate Debate of 4 April 79, supra
note 3, at 1; Doggett, Damages from Deception, supra note 7, at 1; Doggett, "How Much
Does It Hurt?"-DamagesUnder the 1979 Amendments to the DTPA-Consumer Protection Act 1 (1979) (unpublished essay available from the State Bar of Texas) [Hereinafter
cited as Doggett, "How Much Does It Hurt?"].
9. See Hearing on S.B. 357, supra note 3, at 2 (S.B. 357 intended to retain protection
from fraud in the marketplace; yet keep it free from "legal blackmail"); Hearing on H.B.
744, supra note 3, at 5, 8 (H.B. 744 attempts to be fair to both sides: when fraud is found,
give consumer treble damages); Letter from Senator Bill Meier to Members of Texas Senate
(Mar. 28, 1979) (unpublished letter on file with Sen. Bill Meier's Office, Capitol Station,
Austin, Texas) (S.B. 357 strikes fair balance in marketplace, while retaining means to punish fraud through damages and court costs). The TDTPA provides for the mandatory trebling of the first one thousand dollars of actual damages, plus the amount of actual damages
which exceed one thousand dollars. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon
Supp. 1980). It also calls for the mandatory recovery of attorneys' fees and court costs by
prevailing consumers. Id. § 17.50(d). The TDTPA has maintained an incentive for consumers to seek redress, even for minor claims, while deterring sellers from engaging in deceptive
practices in a fashion similar to that found in the original TDTPA. Compare id.
§ 17.50(b)(1) (consumer awarded actual damages plus two times amount of actual damages
not exceeding one thousand dollars) (if act proved "knowingly" consumer can recover up to
three times amount of actual damages exceeding one thousand dollars) and id. § 17.50(d)
(attorneys' fees and court costs awarded successful consumer) with 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch.
143, sec. 1, § 17.50(b)(1), at 327 (prevailing consumer awarded three times actual damages
plus attorneys' fees, court costs).
10. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50A (Vernon Supp. 1980); Boyle, 1979
Amendments to the Deceptive Trade Practices Act: Elements of Proof and Breach of Warranties 5-6 (1979) (unpublished essay available from the State Bar of Texas) [Hereinafter
cited as Boyle, Elements of Proof and Breach of Warranties]; O'Gorman, Omnibus Clause
and Settlement Procedure, supra,note 6, at 2-3. But see Senate Debate of 10 April 79,
supra note 6, at 17 (S.B. 357 encourages consumer litigation not settlement). See generally
Hearing on S.B. 357, supra note 3, at 7, 9 (TDTPA designed to promote incentives for
conciliation and settlement).
11. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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tion Act1 2 was revised with the addition of chapter ten, Deceptive Trade
Practices. s Under the revised statute persons engaging in deceptive trade
practices could be enjoined from using deceptive practices.14 The Consumer Protection Division of the Attorney General's Office was authorized, at the request of the Consumer Credit Commissioner, to seek an
injunction against a seller who engaged in a practice violating the Act's
"laundry list."1 Injunctive relief, however, was not made available to private consumers.16

12. See 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 274, § 1, at 608-09. The revision of Title 79 was
prompted by the legislature's finding of facts and determination that:
(1) Many Citizens of our State are being victimized ....
(4) Unscrupulous operators, lenders and vendors, many of whom are transient to
our State, are presently engaged in many abusive and deceptive practices in the conduct of their businesses ....
(5) These facts conclusively indicate a need . . . to prohibit deceptive trade practices in all types of consumer transactions,.
(6) It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this revision . . .to protect the
citizens of Texas from abusive and deceptive practices now being perpetrated by unscrupulous operators, lenders and vendors in both cash and credit consumer transactions . . . and thus serve the public interest of the people of the state.
Id.
13. See id. § 2., arts. 10.01-.05 at 659-60 (chapter ten of Texas Interest-Consumer
Credit and Consumer Protection Act, Deceptive Trade Practices, codified as Tax. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-10.01-.05 (Vernon 1970)).
14. See 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 274, § 2, arts. 10.02, 10.04, at 658-59.
15. See id. art. 10.04, at 658-59; D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION §§ 3.01, 3.05, at 72, 78 (1978). The term "laundry list," as used hereinafter, refers to the several specifically enumerated acts or practices contained in this and other
"deceptive trade practices" laws, which are considered to be per se illegal. See Spradling v.
Williams, 566 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tex. 1978); Maxwell, Public and Private Rights and Remedies Under the Deceptive Trade Practices-ConsumerProtection Act, in STATE BAR OF
TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS, Ch.E at 4-10 (1977), also
printed in 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 617, 625-34 (1977). Some of the acts declared to be deceptive
are the representation of goods as being new or original if they are deteriorated, reconditioned, or second hand; knowingly making false or misleading statements of fact concerning
the need for parts, replacement or repair service; and the disconnecting, turning back, or
resetting of an odometer of any motor vehicle to reduce the mileage appearing on the odometer. See 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 274, § 2, art. 10.01(b), at 658. See generally D. BRAGG, P.
MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION viii, 254 (1978); Hill, Introduction to
Consumer Law Symposium, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 609, 611 (1977); Lynn, A Remedy for Undermade and Oversold Products-The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 7 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 698, 698 (1976); Comment, Measure of Damages For Misrepresentation Under the
Texas. Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 135, 135-36 (1977).
16. Cf. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 274, § 2, art. 10.04, at 658 (by filing a written complaint with Consumer Credit Commissioner, consumer could get Attorney General to investigate alleged deceptive practices). See generally id. § 2, art. 10.04, at 658-59 (independent
cause of action for private consumer unavailable).
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This limited injunctive procedure was amended in 1969 to allow the
Attorney General to independently seek injunctions against sellers engaging in deceptive practices.17 The 1969 amendments also expanded the
scope of practices declared unlawful under the Texas Interest-Consumer
Credit and Consumer Protection Act,1 s by providing that Texas courts
should construe the meaning of "deceptive practices" according to guidelines established by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and federal
20
court interpretations " of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA).
The consumer protection laws enacted by Texas in 1967 and 1969 were1
the progeny of the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act (UCSPA),'
the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA),2 2 and the FTCA.2'
Through the synthesis of these acts, Texas law incorporated the advantages available from both an "omnibus clause" and a "laundry list."'2' The

17. See 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 452, § 1, art. 10.04, at 1506; D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL &
J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW Viii

(1978).

18. See 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 452, § 1, art. 10.01(b), at 1504-05.
19. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-45 (West Supp. 1979). Under the FTCA's test, the fact that
an act or practice has the tendency or capacity to deceive is sufficient to render it "false,
misleading, or deceptive." Id. § 45(a)(1); see American Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. FTC, 255
F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1958) (fact evidence failed to show deception not conclusive, test is
whether practice is likely to deceive); Charles of the Ritz Dist. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676,
678-80 (2d Cir. 1944) (actual deception need not be shown); FTC v. Hires Turner Glass Co.,
81 F.2d 362, 363 (3d Cir. 1935) (defendant violated FTCA because his product had "tendency and capacity to. . .deceive"); Lynn, Anatomy of A Deceptive Trade Practices Case,
31 Sw. L.J. 867, 869 (1977); Maxwell, Public and Private Rights and Remedies Under the
Deceptive Trade Practices-ConsumerProtectionAct, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS, Ch.E at 2-4 (1977), also printed in 8 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 617, 621 (1977); Project, Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1005, 1056 n.107 (1967); Comment, Caveat Vendor: The Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices and Consumer ProtectionAct, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 425, 440 (1973); Longley, Consumer Protection7-8 (1978) (unpublished essay available from State Bar of Texas) [Hereinafter cited as Longley, Consumer 'Protection].
20. See Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d 561, 562-63 (Tex. 1978) (courts directed to
use "capacity to deceive" test established by federal precedent); State v. Credit Bureau of
Laredo, 530 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tex. 1975) (statute directs courts to look at FTCA to interpret
Texas statute); Wesware, Inc. v. State, 488 S.W.2d 844, 848 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972,
no writ) (legislature intended courts follow law promulgated by federal courts as far as possible); 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 452, § 1, art. 10.02(b), at 1505; cf. Bourland v. State, 528
S.W.2d 350, 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court upheld jury charge
that the issue was whether conduct had "capacity to deceive").
21. See 7A U.L.A. BUSINESS AND FINANCE LAWS, UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES
ACT 1-34 (1978).

22. See 7A U.L.A.

BUSINESS AND FINANCE LAWS, UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES

ACT 35-90 (1978).
23. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-45 (1976).
24. See 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 452, § 1, art. 10.02, at 1505 ("omnibus clause"); 1967
Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 274, § 2, art. 10.01(b), at 658 ("laundry list"), as amended by 1969 Tex.
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benefits derived from this action included: having a vast body of law upon
which state courts could rely for guidance;"8 reducing the possibility of
federal preemption of state consumer protection laws;26 and providing
consistency, thereby reassuring businessmen that the state's trade standards are substantially in7 line with those of interstate commerce and
neighboring jurisdictions.2

Despite the advantages derived from incorporating the "omnibus
clause" and "laundry list" into the Texas act,"' the statute failed to provide a private cause of action. 2 ' The absence of a private remedy consti-

tuted an "Achilles' Heel" on Texas consumer protection laws until 1973.0

Gen. Laws, ch. 452, § 1, art. 10.01(b), at 1504-05 ("laundry list"). The "laundry list" sets out

practices which are per se unlawful. To prevail, a consumer need only prove the practice
occurred. See Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tex. 1978); 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws,
ch. 452, § 1, arts. 10.01(b), 10.02(a), at 1504-05; D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS
CONSUMER LITIGATION §§ 3.01, 3.05, at 72, 78 (1978). See generally 7A U.L.A. BUSINESS AND
FINANCE LAWS, UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT

§§

2-3, at 48-60 (1978) (1966

UDTPA); Maxwell, Public and Private Rights and Remedies Under the Deceptive Trade
Practices-ConsumerProtection Act, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR
GENERAL PRACTITIONERS, Ch.E at 4 (1977), also printed in 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 617, 625 (1977).

25. See Wesware, Inc. v. State, 488 S.W.2d 844, 848 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, no
Writ).
26. See, e.g., McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 131-32 (1912); Savage v. Jones, 225
U.S. 501, 533 (1911); Double-Eagle Lubricants, Inc. v. Texas, 248 F. Supp. 515, 518 (N.D.
Tex. 1965). See generally Project, Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1136-39; Note, State Consumer Protection:A Proposal,53 IOWA L. REV.
710, 732-34 (1967).
27. See Comment, Consumer Protection in Georgia: The Fair Business Practices Act
of 1975, 25 EMORY L.J. 445, 455 (1976). But cf. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374,
385 (1965) ("deceptive practices" a legal standard requiring judicial construction); Dole, The
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act: Another Step Toward a National Law of Unfair
Trade Practices,51 MINN. L. REV. 1005, 1052 (1967) (Uniform DTPA omitted damages remedy to avoid imposing liability for inadvertent deception under FTCA); Comment, Caveat
Vendor" The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and ConsumerProtection Act, 25 BAYLOR L.
REV. 425, 439-40 (1973) (FTC interpretations do not give notice to persons subject to
TDTPA of what is unlawful); Note, 54 N.C. L. REV. 963, 967-68 (1976) (state courts should
give considerable weight to FTC judgment due to agency's expertise, but meaning of "deceptive practices" still question of law for the courts).
28. See 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 452, § 1, arts. 10.01-.08, at 1504-09.
29. See generally id. § 1, arts. 10.01-.08, at 1504-09; 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 274, § 2,
arts. 10.01-.05, at 658-60.
30. Compare 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 452, § 1, art. 10.04, at 1506 (no private cause of
action) and 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 274, § 2, art. 10.04, at 658-59 (no private cause of
action) with 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, sec. 1, § 17.50, at 326-27 (statutory remedy available to private consumer). The adoption of a private cause of action for deceptive trade
practices was a reflection of the legislature's recognition of the inadequacies of common law
remedies. See Woo v. Great Southwestern Acceptance Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tex. Civ.

App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). At common law, the only remedy available to an aggrieved consumer was the tort action of fraud. A cause of action in fraud placed an onerous
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In 1973, the Sixty-third Texas Legislature3' acknowledged the inade-

quacies of common law remedies and responded by enacting the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (TDTPA).8 '
The 1973 statute was predominantly an adoption of prior Texas consumer legislation. 8 The TDTPA was based upon principles of fairness,
and was designed to render deceptive trade practices unprofitable in
Texas. 4 Under the 1973 TDTPA a consumer was allowed to bring a private cause of action for damages.8

5

Consequently, consumer interests were

burden of proof upon the injured plaintiff. See, e.g., McCall v. Trucks of Texas, Inc., 535
S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ refd n.r.e.); Brady v. Johnson, 512 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ); Panhandle & S.F. Ry. v.
O'Neal, 119 S.W.2d 1077, 1079-80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1938, writ ref'd); cf. Johnson v.
Beneficial Management Corp., 538 P.2d 510, 513 (Wash. 1975) (cause of action for unfair or
deceptive practices unknown at common law). See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971); Hill, Introduction to Consumer Law Symposium, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 609, 610-11 (1977).
31. The Sixty-third Legislature is commonly referred to as the "reform legislature" because it was the first meeting of Texas lawmakers following the 1971 "Sharpstown Scandal."
See D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION vii (1978); Maxwell,
Public and Private Rights and Remedies Under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer
ProtectionAct, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS,
Ch.E at 1-2 (1977), also printed in 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 617, 618 (1977).
32. See Woo v. Great Southwestern Acceptance Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (Act resulted from legislative recognition of inadequacies
of common law remedies). See generally 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, sec. 1, §§ 17.41-.63,
at 322-43. The TDTPA's provisions for private remedies, section 17.50(a), and treble damages, section 17.50(b)(1), resulted in the Act's being heralded as the most far-reaching and
significant piece of legislation enacted in 1973. See D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY,
TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION Viii

(1978); Maxwell, Public and Private Rights and Remedies

Under the Deceptive Trade Practices-ConiumerProtectionAct, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS,
TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS, Ch.E at 2 (1977), also printed in 8 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 617, 620 (1977); Nicewander, The Impact of Consumer Laws on Your Everyday

Practice,in

STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS,

Ch.A

at 6 (1977).
33. Compare 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, sec. 1, §§ 17.41-.63, at 322-43 with 1969
Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 452, § 1, arts. 10.01-.08, at 1504-09 and 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 274,
§ 2, arts. 10.01-.05, at 658-60. See generally D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS
CONSUMER LITIGATION viii (1978); Maxwell, Public and PrivateRights and Remedies Under
the Deceptive Trade Practices-ConsumerProtection Act, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS
CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS, Ch.E at 2 (1977), also printed in 8 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 617, 620-21 (1977); Hill, Introduction to Consumer Law Symposium, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J.
609, 612 (1977).
34. See Hill, Foreward to D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION v (1978).
35. See 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, sec. 1, § 17.50(a),(b)(1), at 326-27. Prior to the
enactment of statutory remedies in 1973, Texas consumers were relegated to the use of common law fraud to redress damages for deceptive practices. See Woo v. Great Southwestern
Acceptance Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); cf.
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protected by promoting consumer action s3 rather than relying upon public enforcement by the Attorney General. 87 Furthermore, the TDTPA was
intended to deter unscrupulous vendors from engaging in deceptive practices by allowing injured consumers to recover "treble damages." 8
The need for allowing the recovery of three times the actual damages
sustained by a consumer developed because of the small amount of damages usually involved in consumers cases.8 " Unscrupulous vendors were

Johnson v. Beneficial Management Corp., 538 P.2d 510, 513 (Wash. 1975) (concept of action
for deceptive trade practices unknown at common law). See generally D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW vii (1978); Maxwell, Public and Private Rights
and Remedies Under the Deceptive Trade Practices-ConsumerProtection Act, in STATE
BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS, Ch.E at 1 (1977), also
printed in 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 617, 617 (1977); see also D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY,
TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION 177 (1978); Hill, Introduction to Consumer Law Symposium, 8
ST. MARY' L.J. 609, 613 (1977); Lovett, Private Actions for Deceptive Trade Practices, 23
ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 271 (1971) (private remedies desirable for consumer bargaining power
and disciplining fraud in the marketplace); Lovett, State Deceptive Trade PracticeLegislation, 46 TUL. L. REv. 724, 749 (1972) (statutory remedy gives consumer leverage to obtain
fair treatment).
36. See Woo v. Great Southwestern Acceptance Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (act designed to encourage consumer to litigate grievances); McDaniel v. Dulworth, 550 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ)
(legislative intent to encourage consumer to seek redress); 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, sec.
1, § 17.44, at 322-23. Compare Bragg, Now We're All Consumers! The 1975 Amendments to
the Consumer Protection Act, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 3, 18 (1976) (treble damages evidence
legislative intent to provide consumer incentive to sue on small claims) and Lynn, A Remedy for Undermade and Oversold Products-The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 7
ST. MARY'S L.J. 698, 721 (1976) (treble damages awarded consumer encourages consumer
redress and enhances statute's deterrent effect) and Comment, The Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices-Consumer Protection Act: Application to Professional Malpractice, 8 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 763, 769 (1977) (incentive for consumer litigation found in treble damages) with
Lovett, State Deceptive Trade PracticeLegislation, 46 TuL. L. REV. 724, 745 (1972) (punitive damages serve function, but may tempt unwarranted claims).
37. See Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 670 (Tex. 1977) (treble damages create
consumer incentive to file suit, lessening demand for public enforcement); Leikam & Corbin,
Woods v. Littleton: Consumerism Comes of Age, 18 S. TEX. L.J. 477, 481 (1977) (treble
damages reduce necessity for public enforcement actions). See generally D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION v-vi, § 8.01, at 177-79 (1978); Lynn, A
Remedy for Undermade and Oversold Products-The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 698, 1i20-21 (1976); Comment, The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act: Application to Professional Malpractice, 8 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 763, 769 (1977); Doggett, "How Much Does It Hurt?", supra note 8, at 5.
38. See, e.g., Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 669 (Tex. 1977) (legislature provided
treble damages to deter unscrupulous sellers); Woo v. Great Southwestern Acceptance
Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (as a deterrent to
unlawful conduct, consumer allowed recovery of treble damages under TDTPA); McDaniel
v. Dulworth, 550 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ) (legislature intended treble damages to deter unscrupulous sellers).
39. See D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION § 8.01, at
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free to defraud consumers with virtual impunity because few consumers
could afford to pursue a legal remedy for recovery of such small

amounts.' 0 This was particularly true considering the heavy burden of
proof and high legal costs involved in consumer cases."
Four years after implementation of the TDTPA, however, the question
of whether treble damages were to be mandatorily awarded remained unanswered.' 2 The Texas Supreme Court finally resolved this issue in

176-77 (1978); Comment, The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-ConsumerProtectionAct:
Application to Professional Malpractice, 8 ST. MARY's L.J. 763, 769 (1977); cf. Woods v.
Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 669-70 (Tex. 1977) (treble damages encourage consumers to sue);
McDaniel v. Dulworth, 550 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ) (treble
damages an incentive for consumer redress). See generally Nicewander, The Impact of Consumer Laws on Your Everyday Practice, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR
GENEIRAL PRACTITIONERS, Ch.A at 1 (1977); Hearing on S.B. 357, supra note 3, at 46; Longley, Consumer Protection,supra note 19, at 1. It has been argued treble damages were intended as a penalty against the seller. See, e.g., Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 22 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 212, 215 (Feb. 10, 1979); Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex. 1978)
(Greenhill, C.J., concurring); Singleton v. Pennington, 568 S.W.2d 367, 375-76 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1977, writ granted).
40. Cf. Walker v. Sheldon, 179 N.E.2d 497, 499, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (1961) (infrequent litigation will not deter illicit business). In Walker v. Sheldon, the New York Court of
Appeals noted:
In the calculation of his expected profits, the wrongdoer is likely to allow for a certain
amount of money which will be returned to those victims who object too vigorously
and he will be perfectly content to bear the additional cost of infrequent litigation as
the price for continuing his illicit business.
Id. at 499, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
41. See Telephone interview with David Bragg, Chief of the Consumer Protection Division, Office of the Attorney General of the State of Texas, in Austin (Jan. 9, 1980). See
generally D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION § 8.01, at 17677 (1978); Hill, Foreword to D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION v (1978); Maxwell, Public and Private Rights and Remedies Under the Deceptive
Trade.Practices-ConsumerProtection Act, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW
FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS, Ch.E at 1 (1977), also printed in 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 617, 618
(1977); Nicewander, The Impact of Consumer Law on Your Everyday Practice, in STATE
BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS, Ch.A at 1 (1977); Hill,
Introduction to Consumer Law Symposium, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 609, 609-10 (1977); Lovett,
Private Actions for Deceptive Trade Practices, 23 ADMIN. L. REv. 271, 271-74 (1971);
Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 iPUL. L. REv. 724, 747-48 (1972);
Lynn, A Remedy For Undermade and Oversold Products-The Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 698, 721 (1976); Comment, Translating Sympathy for
Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 409

(1966).
42. Compare Mallory v. Custor, 537 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no
writ) (treble damages permissive not mandatory under TDTPA) with McDaniel v. Dulworth, 550 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ) (treble damages like
attorneys' fees mandatory not discretionary under TDTPA).
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Woods v. Littleton's holding treble damages were mandatory once liability under the Act was established." Woods and its progeny, however,
placed an inequitable economic burden upon some
businesses' 5 and led to
6
the introduction of Senate Bill 357 in 1979.4

II. ANALYSIS OF THE 1979 AMENDMENTS
The 1979 revisions to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (TDTPA) are a renewed effort to establish a working equilibrium between consumers and vendors in the marketplace. The
amendments are designed to achieve an equitable solution to the problem
of consumer fraud by striking a balance between consumer needs and the
43. 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977).
44. Id. at 671. The Texas Supreme Court ruled: "[c]onsidering the structure of the
Statute as a whole and its declared purpose, it is clear the award of treble damages is made
mandatory." Id. at 671. See generally Lynn, Anatomy of A Deceptive Trade Practices Case,
31 Sw. L.J. 867, 878-79 (1977).
45. Cf. Longoria v. Atlantic Gulf Enterprises, Inc., 572 S.W.2d 71, 76 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (prevailing consumer receives mandatory treble
damages); Bowman v. Woodmansee, 554 S.W.2d 33, 34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no
writ) (treble damages mandatory under section 17.50(b)(1)); Fambrough, Let the Realty Industry Beware: The Death of Caveat Emptor, TIERRA GRANDE, 1978, at 6 (TDTPA encourages consumer suits, not protection of merchants).
46. In his introductory remarks to House Bill 744, Representative Danny Hill described
the mandatory treble damages of the TDTPA as a "hammer in the hands of the plaintiff's
attorney in order to force a settlement because [the defendant] cannot win." See Hearingon
H.B. 744, supra note 3, at 5. To remedy this inequity Senator Bill Meier evidenced his
intent to introduce "fault" and "intent" as the standard for recovery of treble damages and
thereby bring balance back into the marketplace. He described the TDTPA, then in effect,
as a statute that is so one sided that it practically constituted "legal blackmail." See Hearing on S.B. 357, supra note 3, at 1-2. Mr. R. Jack Ayers, Jr., a Dallas attorney testifying
before the Senate Economic Development Committee in favor of S.B. 357, commented:
[P]eople can be penalized in treble damages for incorrect speech, mistakes, . .. and
that sort of thing .... [Tihat is one of the things that Senate Bill 357 seeks to'rectify. Without some requirement that the consumer establish and prove a case [under,
the TDTPA], I don't know how the persons who are involved in the sale of goods...
will ever have their arms in a consumer transaction anywhere close to an equal level
[with consumers].
Id. at 3 (emphasis added). See generally Doggett, "How Much Does It Hurt?", supra note 8,
at 6. "Promoters of S.B. 357 emphasized that treble damages mandated against 'innocent'
businesses constituted the justification for a major overhaul of the DTPA." Doggett, "How
Much Does It Hurt?", supra note 8, at 6. See also Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice
Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 724, 745 (1972). Punitive damages up to a certain level serve a
valuable purpose; however, "as consumer recoveries become enriched by double or treble
damages, the temptation for unwarranted claims may also increase. Therefore, a greater
constraint against harassment may be required when punitive damages are easily obtained
by consumers." Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REv. 724,
725 "(1972).
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burden imposed upon businesses.' 7 In an effort to achieve these objectives

Senate Bill 357, as enacted,' 8 amends six sections" and adds two new
sections50 to the TDTPA. s1
A.

Cumulative Remedies

The cumulative remedies section has retained the essence of the original TDTPA.5 ' The remedies made available by the TDTPA are of a cumulative rather than exclusive nature;8' therefore, it is possible for a deceptive practice to be actionable under both the TDTPA and another
law." To recover damages under the TDTPA in addition to those available at common law or under another statute, a plaintiff must establish the
existence of an act or practice in violation of the TDTPA." This limitation will not apply, however, if the statute serving as the basis of the

plaintiff's action expressly recites that an act or practice in violation of its
provisions is actionable under the TDTPA as well." Remedies under the
TDTPA will cease to be cumulative if the recovery of actual damages and
assessment of penalties are available under both laws to redress the same
act or practice. 7 These limitations and guidelines were enacted to achieve
47. See Hearing on H.B. 744, supra note 3, at 1, 5; Hearing on S.B. 357, supr6 note 3,
at 1-4.
48. See 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 603, § 1, at 1327-32.
49. See Tx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §8 17.43, 17.45(9), 17.46, 17.50, 17.50A, 17.56
(Vernon Supp. 1980).
50. See id. 88 17.50B, 17.56A.
51. See id. 88 17.41-.63.
52. Compare id. § 17.43 with 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, sec. 1, § 17.43, at 322. See
generally Maxwell, The 1979 Amendments to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices -Consumer ProtectionAct, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITiONERS, Ch.A at 2 (1979).
53. See Tx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.43 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
54. See id.
55. See id. Section 17.43 recites in pertinent part, "[t]he remedies provided ... are in
addition to. . .remedies provided for in any other law .... " Id. (emphasis added). Although section 17.43 does not state whether the "other law[sJ" are state or federal laws, the
construction given to the TDTPA under section 17.44 implies that it refers to both federal
and state laws. Cf. Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 669 (Tex. 1977) (section 17.44 given.
liberal construction); Woo v. Great Southwestern Acceptance Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290, 298
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (TDTPA intended to give greatest amount
"actual damages" proved).
56. See Tax. Bus. & COm. CODE ANN. § 17.43 (Vernon Supp. 1980). Articles 5221f and
6701g-2 of Vernon's Revised Texas Civil Statutes make a violation of their provisions a
violation of the TDTPA. See Tax. Rzv. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221f, § 17(d) (Vernon 1971 &
Supp. 1979) & art. 6701g-2, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
57. See Tax. Bus. & COu. CODE ANN. § 17.43 (Vernon Supp. 1980). "[N]o recovery shall
be permitted under both ... [the TDTPA] ... and another law of both actual damages
and penalties for the same act or practice." Id.
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two purposes: prevention of multiple recovery of damages for a single act
or practice,58 and preclusion of the use of "bootstrapping" to escalate a
violation of another law into a suit for treble damages under the
TDTPA.5 9
B.

Unlawful Deceptive Trade Practices
The 1979 TDTPA continues the prohibition against unlawful deceptive

trade practices in consumer transactions." There are, however, some sub-

stantial changes in what constitutes an unlawful deceptive trade practice.
Although the "omnibus clause" is retained by the amendments to the
TDTPA, the clause no longer provides the broad umbrella of protection
enjoyed by consumers under the original TDTPA. s1 Conduct considered
unlawful under the "omnibus clause" is subject to prosecution only by
the Consumer Protection Division of the Attorney General's Office."'
When utilized by the Attorney General the "omnibus clause" is still to be
construed by Texas courts in accordance with federal interpretations
given to the pertinent sections of the FTCA. e8 Armed with the "omnibus

58. See id.; cf. American Transfer & Storage Co. v. Brown, 584 S.W.2d 284, 293 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ granted) (court denied recovery under TDTPA when damages
sought were same as provided for by party's insurance contract). See generally Maxwell,
The 1979 Amendments to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices -Consumer Protection
Act, in STATE BAR

OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS,

Ch.A at 2

(1979); Senate Bill 357-Legislative Intent, § 1, at 2 (1979) (unpublished legislative report,
available from Sen. Bill Meier's Office, Capitol Station, Austin, Texas) (section 17.43, Cumulative Remedies, amended to prevent possible "stacking of damages on damages" of overlapping consumer laws).
59. See Hearing on H.B. 744, supra note 3, at 16. Representative Danny Hill, in his
introductory remarks, noted that section 17.43 does not preclude violations of other laws
from also being a violation of the TDTPA; however, the existence of an actual violation of
another law will not be considered prima facie evidence that the act is an illegal deceptive
trade practice. Hearing on H.B. 744, supra note 3, at 16.
60. See TEx. Bus. & Com. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
61. See Maxwell, The 1979 Amendments to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Consumer Protection Act, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL
PRACTITIONERS, Ch.A at 3-4 (1979). Compare TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a)
(Vernon Supp. 1980) with 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, sec. 1, § 17.46, at 323-24.
62. Compare TEx. Bus. & COM.CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980) ("omnibus
clause" actionable only by Consumer Protection Division) with 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch.
143, sec. 1, §§ 17.46(a), 17.50, at 323, 326 ("omnibus clause" actionable by private consumers). See generally Maxwell, The 1979 Amendments to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-ConsumerProtection Act, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS, Ch.A at 3-4 (1979); O'Gorman, Ominbus Clause and Settlement
Procedure, supra note 6, at 2 (consumer denied use of "omnibus clause").
63. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM.CODE ANN. § 17.46(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1980) with 1973
Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, sec. 1, § 17.46(c), at 324. See generally Hearingon S.B. 357, supra
note 3, at 9-10.
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clause," the Attorney General remains unfettered by the constraints of
the "laundry list";"' consequently, the Attorney General may seek an injunction against any practice having the "tendency or capacity to
decieve." s
The Act, as amended, limits a private cause of action to redress specific
violations of the "laundry list,"" breach of warranty, and unconscionable
actions.67 Consequently, a consumer can no longer maintain a private
cause of action under the "omnibus clause."' "s Restricting the meaning of
"deceptive practices" to the twenty-three specific practices enumerated in
the "laundry list" is not the only limitation with regard to private causes
of action." When construing the provisions of the TDTPA in private
suits, Texas courts are no longer required to make mandatory use of federal interpretations of the meaning of "deceptive practices" under the
FTCA.70 Texas courts may, however, make discretionary use of "relevant
and pertinent" opinions rendered in other jurisdictions, not necessarily
federal. 7 1 Significantly, both proponents and opponents to S.B. 357 believe the limitations placed upon private causes of action may not ad-

64. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Vernon SUpp. 1980).
65. See State v. Credit Bureau of Laredo, Inc., 530 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tex. 1975); Bourland v. State, 528 S.W.2d 350, 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
66. See TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.46(b), 17.50(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980). Subsection (d) of section 17.46 provides that, for the purposes of relief authorized individual
consumers under section 17.50(a)(1), as amended in 1979, the term "false, misleading, or
deceptive acts" is limited to those items enumerated on the "laundry list." Id. § 17.46(d).
67. See id. § 17.50(a)(2), (3).
68. See id. § 17.46(a), (d).
69. See id. § 17.46(c).
70. Compare id. § 17.46(c)(1) (use of FTCA interpretations mandatory only in suits
brought by Attorney General) and id. § 17.46(c)(2) (courts may consider pertinent opinions
from other jurisdictions) with 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, sec. 1, § 17.46(c), at 324 (use of
FTCA interpretations mandatory in all cases).
71. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1980). In a private
cause of action arising after August 27, 1979, the most "relevant and pertinent" decisions
available to Texas courts construing the meaning of the term "false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices" will be opinions from other jurisdictions interpreting the "laundry
lists" of other states and not federal interpretations of the FTCA. The FTCA, 15 U.S.C.
45(a)(1) (1976), proscribes unfair or deceptive trade practices in its "omnibus clause." Due
to the express language of subsection (d) of section 17.46 limiting the definition of "false,
misleading, or deceptive acts or practices" to the specific practices enumerated in subsection
(b) of section 17.46, judicial interpretations of the FTCA's definition of "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices" are no longer truly "relevant and pertinent." See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 17.46(b), (d) (Vernon Supp. 1980). But cf. Maxwell, The 1979 Amendments to the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices- Consumer Protection Act, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS,
TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS, Ch.A at 4-5 (1979) (FTCA to be used as
precedent in private actions).
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versely affect consumers." This optimism is based upon several "laundry
list" items considered capable of interpretations broad enough to cover
7

any consumer complaint.

3

The "laundry list" restricts the deceptive practices actionable by a consumer,7 4 and unless the provisions of the "laundry list" are broadly interpreted, human ingenuity will find ways to circumvent the basic intent of
the TDTPA.75 The responsibility for developing "broad interpretations"
72. Cf. Hearing on H.B. 744, supra note 3, at 24 (90 percent of private TDTPA cases

actionable under three or four of "laundry list" items); State Bar of Texas, Consumer Law:
Changes in the Deceptive Trade Practices Act by the 1979 Legislature 1, 9-10 (1979) (un-

published script available from the Consumer Law Video Services Division of the State Bar
of Texas) (several of "laundry list" items are broad) [Hereinafter cited as Changes in the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act]. But cf. O'Gorman, Omnibus Clause and Settlement Procedure, supra note 6, at 2 (deceptive practice not on "laundry list" must be so prevalent or
harsh that public policy demands it be actionable). See also Doggett, "How Much Does It
Hurt?", supra note 8, at 1 (S.B. 357 resolved "actual damages" ambiguities beneficial to
consumer); Doggett, Damages from Deception, supra note 7, at 1 (ambiguities resolved in
favor of consumer by S.B. 357).
73. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980). Section 17.46(b)
recites in pertinent parts:
(5) representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics,
ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities which they do not have or that a person has a
sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection which he does not;
(7) representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or
grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another;
(12) representing that an agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not have or involve, or which are prohibited by law;
(23) the failure to disclose information concerning goods or services which was
known at the time of the transaction if such failure to disclose such information was
intended to induce the consumer into a transaction into which the consumer would
not have entered had the information been disclosed.
Id.
74. See id. §§ 17.46(d), 17.50(a)(1); Maxwell, The 1979 Amendments to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-ConsumerProtection Act, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS, Ch.A at 3-4 (1979); cf Rothschild, A Guide to
Georgia's FairBusiness Practices Act of 1975, 10 GA. L. REv. 917, 935 (1976). By using a
general prohibition against "unfair and deceptive" practices the Georgia Legislature insured
the ability of the Georgia Act "to prevent the latest fraudulent schemes without need for
annual revision" of its "laundry list." Id. at 934-35. See generally Senate Debate of 10 April
79, supra note 6, at 3-4 (though deceptive, practices not appearing on list are nonactionable).
75. See Senate Debate of 10 April 79, supra note 6, at 3-4. The United States Supreme
Court has long recognized "[i]tis impossible to frame definitions which will embrace all
unfair practices. There is no limit to human inventiveness in this field. Even if all known
unfair practices were specifically defined and prohibited, it would be at once necessary to
begin over again." FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 312 n.2 (1934). See also
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to assure consumer protection rests upon the courts." Texas courts con-

struing these specific practices should be cognizant of the fact the "laundry list" contains the only deceptive practices capable of serving as the
basis for a private cause of action under the TDTPA77 Failure of courts
to construe the "laundry list" broadly will create the need for an annual
revision of the "list" by the legislature to keep the TDTPA abreast of
new deceptive techniques.7
C.

Relief for Consumers

1. Consumer Remedies. In order to recover damages an injured consumer must allege a violation within the "laundry list," a breach of im-

plied or express warranty, or an unconscionable act.7 ' The consumer must
also prove the challenged act or practice was a "producing cause" of the
actual damages suffered.80 This is significant because under the original
TDTPA an aggrieved consumer was only required to demonstrate he had
been "adversely affected" by the alleged deceptive practice to recover
damages.8 1

Rothschild, A Guide to Georgia'sFair Business Practices Act of 1975, 10 GA. L. REv. 917,
935 (1976).
76. The 1979 amendments to the TDTPA became effective August 27, 1979. See 1979
Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 603, § 10, at 1332.
77. See note 74 supra.
78. See Senate Debate of 10 April 79, supra note 6, at 3-4; O'Gorman, Omnibus Clause
and Settlement Procedure,supra note 6, at 2. See also FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291
U.S. 304, 312 n.2 (1934); Rothschild, A Guide to Georgia's Fair Business Practices Act of
1975, 10 GA. L. REv. 917, 935 (1976).
79. See TEx, Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980). This situation is
similar to one that developed at common law, where a plaintiff was required to conform his
complaint to one of the established forms of action (writs), or else find himself without an
ordinary legal remedy. See 1 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 21, at 2830 (5th ed. 1941). This problem was solved by the development of the Court of Chancery
(Equity Courts). See id. § 1, at 1-2. Compare Hearing on H.B. 744, supra note 3, at 24
(TDTPA's "laundry list" broad enough to encompass any potential deceptive practice) with
FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 312 n.2 (1934) (human inventiveness renders
most complete list of deceptive practices automatically obsolete) and Senate Debate of 10
April 79, supra note 6, at 3-4 (if not in the "laundry list" an act is non-actionable, though
deceptive) and O'Gorman, Omnibus Clause and Settlement Procedure,supra note 6, at 2
(TDTPA prohibits only specific actions listed).
80. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980); Maxwell, The
1979 Amendments to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-ConsumerProtection Act, in
STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS, Ch.A at 10 (1979).
81. See 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, sec. 1, § 17.50(a), at 326; Longley, Consumer
Protection, supra note 19, at 27. But see D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS
CONSUMER LITIGATION § 8.03, at 180-81 (1978); Bragg, Special Issues in Deceptive Trade
Practices Cases, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS, Ch.C at 8 (1979).
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The term "producing cause" is not defined in the TDTPA. ss The Texas
Supreme Court in Great American Indemnity Co. v. Sams8s stated the
term "producing cause" has been held to be a non-legal term, therefore,
one not requiring a legal definition."' According to the court, "producing
cause" was to be given its "usual and ordinary meaning."85 In its normal
usage a "producing cause" is an act or omission creating or producing
some effect." In recent years the definition, developed in products liability and workmen's compensation cases, has required the act be the sine
qua non of the injury, or in other words, that without which the injury
would not have occured.8s Thus, the adoption of "producing cause" by
the legislature, 8 as the legal standard of causation will require the consumer to prove the alleged deceptive practice was the "causation in fact"
of his injuries.8 ' With the adoption of this standard the greatest obstacle

82. See generally TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1980);
Bragg, Special Issues in Deceptive Trade Practices Cases, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS
CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS, Ch.C

at 8 (1979).

83. 142 Tex. 121, 176 S.W.2d 312 (1943).
84. See id. at 124, 176 S.W.2d at 314.
85. See id. at 124, 176 S.W.2d at 314; Texas & P. Ry. v. Short, 62 S.W.2d 995, 998 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1933, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
86. See Texas & P. Ry. v. Short, 62 S.W.2d 995, 998 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1933,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); cf. Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Sams, 142 Tex. 121, 124, 176 S.W.2d 312, 314
(1943) (tacitly approving conclusions of Short court).
87. See Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 798, 801 (Tex. 1975) (products liability);
Ruddell v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 482 S.W.2d 382, 385 n.2 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (workmen's compensation case). In Rourke v. Garza "producing
cause" was defined as an "efficient, exciting, or contributing cause, which, in a natural sequence, produced injuries or damages complained of, if any." Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d
794, 798, 801 (Tex. 1975). In Ruddell the court defined the term to mean "an injury or
condition which, either independently or together with one or more other injuries or conditions, results in incapacity, and without which such incapacity would not have occurred
when it did." Ruddell v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 482 S.W.2d 382, 385 n.2 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1972, writ refd n.r.e.).
88. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
89. See Doggett, "How Much Does It Hurt?",supra note 8, at 4 ("[Tlhe question to be
submitted to a jury is now clearly that of causation in fact. . . ."). See generally D. BRAGO,
P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION § 8.03, at 180-82 (1978); Bragg,
Special Issues in Deceptive Trade Practices Cases, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS, Ch.C at 8 (1979); Maxwell, The 1979 Amendments
to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices -Consumer Protection Act, in STATE BAR OF
TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS, Ch.A at 10-11 (1979); Comment,
Measure of Damages for MisrepresentationsUnder the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 135, 135-36 (1977). When a defendant's action did not result in a
loss to the plaintiff, there could be no recovery of damages. See Booth v. Coward, 265 S.W.
1026, 1027 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924, judgmt adopted); Garner-Evans & Co. v. Webber, 363
S.W.2d 383, 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); cf. Pridgen v. Giles, 267
S.W.2d 187, 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austii 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (no recovery when plaintiff
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facing an injured consumer will be to conform his complaint to one of the
authorized actionable categories enumerated in the TDTPA.90 Once the
consumer establishes a cause of action and proves he has sustained actual
damages as a result of the seller's deceptive act or practice, he will be
awarded appropriate relief under the TDTPA.9'
2. Damages Recoverable and Other Relief. In light of the legislative
history of the 1979 TDTPA amendments and recent case law, "actual
damages" recoverable under the Act appear to include both economic and
noneconomic loss. ss Consequential damages, such as mental anguish,

suffered no injury).
90. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
91. See id. § 17.50(b).
92. See Maxwell, 1979 Amendments to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices -Consumer Protection Act, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS, Ch.A at 8 (1979) (citing partial transcript of House Debate on H.B. 744 (May 10,
1979)). Quoting in pertinent part:
Rep. Gibson: Would it . . . include . . . any damages that were incurred by the
plaintiff such as mental anguish?
Rep. Hill: . . .It would include any damages that you could convince the jury had
occurred as a result of the violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
Rep. Gibson: . . . So, in other words, any damages involving mental anguish, any
damages that were consequential from (tortious) act of the defendant would be included in your amendment, is that correct?
Rep. Hill: That's correct.
Id. (emphasis added). Compare Engrossed version of S.B. 357 (version contained definition
of "actual damages," § 17.45(10), which excluded recovery for mental anguish under
TDTPA) with TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (definition of
"actual damages" contained in engrossed version of S.B. 357 deleted). Prior to the 1979
revision of the TDTPA, there was case law suggesting the availability of damages for both
economic and noneconomic loss under the Act. See Dennis Weaver Chevrolet, Inc. v. Chadwick, 575 S.W.2d 619, 621-23 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (damages
for mental anguish recoverable under certain circumstances); Woo v. Great Southwestern
Acceptance Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (plaintiff entitled to greatest amount of damages alleged and proved). Under the 1979 revision of
the TDTPA,
[r]ecovery by consumers of all forms of damages is particularly justified by the weakening of the treble damage remedy. Since there is no longer the possibility that a
substantial mental anguish award by the jury will, unknown to it, be trebled by the
Court, no reason exists to deny the consumer from being restored to whole.
Doggett, "How Much Does It Hurt?'" supra note 8, at 3. But cf. American Transfer & Storage Co. v. Brown, 584 S.W.2d 284, 296-97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ granted) (damages for mental anguish unavailable). The court ruled the absence of a definition of "actual
damages" in the TDTPA or any other indication that "actual damages" included damages
for mental anguish precluded the court from expanding the common law rules regarding the
meaning of "actual damages." Therefore, damages for mental anguish were not allowed.
American Transfer & Storage Co. v. Brown, 584 S.W.2d 284, 297 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1979, writ granted).
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therefore, are recoverable under the TDTPA. s3 To recover consequential
damages, however, a consumer must show the seller's conduct was the
"producing cause" of those damages.94 Upon fulfillment of these TDTPA
requirements, the consumer will receive treble the amount of that portion
of his actual damages not exceeding one thousand dollars. 5 In addition,
the consumer will be entitled to an order enjoining the seller from engaging in deceptive practices or omissions in the future."s Furthermore, the
consumer may obtain any restoration orders necessary to return the parties to their original positions,"9 as well as any other relief the court
deems proper." This unspecified ancillary relief available to a consumer
includes the appointment of receivers or license revocation'with any resultant costs assessed against the seller.9 "
While the noneconomic forms of relief available to consumers are substantially unchanged from the original TDTPA, 100 provisions for the recovery of monetary damages have undergone significant alteration. 1 ' A
consumer who prevails in a cause of action arising after August 27, 1979,
will not automatically recover treble the amount of his actual damages as
required in Woods."'2 Recovery of trebled damages is now limited to the
first one thousand dollars of actual damages awarded,108 unless the trier

93. See Maxwell, The 1979 Amendments to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
-Consumer Protection Act, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL
PRACTITIONERS, Ch.A at 7-9 (1979); Doggett, "How Much Does It Hurt?", supra note 8, at 14.
94. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980). See generally
Maxwell, The 1979 Amendments to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-ConsumerProtection Act, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS,
Ch.A at 7-9 (1979); Doggett, "How Much Does It Hurt?", supra note 8, at 1-4; Longley,
Consumer Protection, supra note 19, at 27-28; Changes in the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act, supra note 72, at 2-3.
95. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
96. See id. § 17.50(b)(2).
97. See id. § 17.50(b)(3).
98. See id. § 17.50(b)(4).
99. See id. § 17.50(b)(4). The assessment of costs and fees against the seller under appropriate circumstances is new to the TDTPA. These assessments may have been included
because not all actual damages awarded are mandatorily trebled under section 17.50(b)(1) of
the revised TDTPA. See id. § 17.50(b)(1).
100. Compare id. § 17.50(b)(1) with 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, sec. 1, § 17.50(b)(1),
at 327.
101. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1980) with
1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, sec. 1, § 17.50(b)(1), at 327.
102. Compare Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 671 (Tex. 1977) (trebling of all actual damages mandatory) with TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp.
1980) (only first one thousand dollars mandatorily trebled).
103. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1980). The following examples illustrate a consumer's recovery when his actual damages are: 1) $500 (or less
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of fact determines the seller committed the illegal act "knowingly." 1' " In
the absence of a "knowing" violation, recovery of damages over one thousand dollars is limited to actual damages. 10 5 Moreover, the mere fact the
seller acted "knowingly" will not automatically result in trebling the damages over the first one thousand dollars. 10 The consumer has no vested
right to treble damages over the first one thousand; the award of up to
three times the amount of the "excess" is discretionary with the trier of
fact.107 The Act is unclear, however, whether the discretionary award, if
made, would be in addition to the actual "excess" 0mandatorily
awarded
8
trebled.
is
it
whether
of
regardless
consumer
the
to

than $1000); 2) equal to $1000; and 3) $1500 (or more than $1000). These examples presume
the seller was not found to have committed the deceptive act "knowingly."
1)

actual damages less than $1000
$ 500 = actual damages sustained
+$1000 = 2 x $500 (See id. § 17.50(b) (1))
$1500 = TOTAL AMOUNT RECOVERED

2)

actual damages equal to $1000
$1000 = actual damages sustained
,+$2000 = 2 x $1000 (See id. § 17.50(b) (1))
$3000 = TOTAL AMOUNT RECOVERED

3)

actual damages greater than $1000
$1500 =, actual damages sustained
+$2000 = 2 x $1000 (See id. § 17.50(b) (1))
$3500 = TOTAL AMOUNT RECOVERED

See generally Bragg, Special Issues in Deceptive Trade Practices Cases in
TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS,

STATE BAR OF

Ch.C at 17-19 (1979); Maxwell,

The 1979 Amendments to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices- Consumer Protection

Act, in STATE

BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS,

Ch.A at 6-

7 (1979); Boyle, Elements of Proof and Breach of Warranties,supra note 10, at 5; Doggett,
"How Much Does It Hurt?", supra note 8, at 4.
104. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1980). Section
17.50(b)(1) allows for the recovery of up to three times the amount of actual damages exceeding one thousand dollars when the defendant's actions are found to have been committed "knowingly." Id.; see id. § 17.45(9). Section 17.45(9) recites: "'Knowingly' means actual
awareness of falsity, deception, or unfairness of the act ...
giving rise to the consumer's
claim ....
but actual awareness may be inferred where objective manifestations indicate
that a person acted with actual awareness." Id. § 17.45(9).
105. See id. § 17.50(b)(1).
106. See id. § 17.50(b)(1).
107. See id. § 17.50(b)(1). The term "excess" means the amount of actual damages over
one thousand dollars awarded a prevailing consumer under section 17.50(b)(1). Id.
§ 17.50(b)(1).
108. See id. § 17.50(b)(1). Any discretionary enlargement of the "excess" by the court
should be awarded in addition to the actual "excess" mandatorily recovered, since the con-
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Nevertheless, this change in the statute settles the question of legislative intent regarding mandatory trebling of damages. 09 By requiring
proof of intent or knowledge as a prerequisite to escalating the amount of
damages awarded in excess of one thousand dollars, the amended
TDTPA should serve to protect an unwitting seller from being assessed
punitive damages. 10 Though not as harsh as its predecessor, the Act
should still help to eradicate fraud in the marketplace.,
D.

Consumer's Attorneys' Fees and Court Costs

Prior to 1979, the language providing for the mandatory award of attorneys' fees and court costs to a prevailing consumer was located in the
same subsection as the treble damages provision.' 2 A consumer was allowed to recover "reasonable" attorneys' fees.'1 The 1979 amendments,
however, create a distinct subsection for attorneys' fees and court costs," 4
and require the consumer show the amount claimed is "reasonable and
necessary" in light of the attendant circumstances. 1 5 The burden of proof
amendment was added to insure hours billed are not excessive."" Further, the mandatory language "shall be awarded" was added to the sub-

sumer would have sustained the onerous burden of proving the seller acted intentionally.
See Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 669 (Tex. 1977) (TDTPA to deter unscrupulous
sellers); Woo v. Great Southwestern Acceptance Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (plaintiff entitled to greatest amount of damages alleged
and proved); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (TDTPA construed
liberally to protect consumers and provide efficient procedures to secure protection). But cf.
Singleton v. Pennington, 568 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ granted)
(treble damages are Draconian). See also Boyle, Elements of Proof and Breach of Warranty, supra note 10, at 5, 10.
109. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
110. See Hearing on H.B. 744, supra note 3, at 7-8; Hearingon S.B. 357, supra note 3,
at 1-3, 6, 37-38.
111. See D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION § 8.01, at
176-77 (1978); Hill, Foreword to D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER
LITIGATION V (1978); Senate Debate of 10 April 79, supra note 6, at 15-16.
112. See Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 669 (Tex. 1977) (consumer's effective relief provided by provision for treble damages, attorneys' fees and court costs).
113. See 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, sec. 1, § 17.50(b)(1), at 327.
114. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (Vernon Supp. 1980) with 1973
Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, sec. 1, § 17.50(b)(1), at 327.
115. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (Vernon Supp. 1980); Maxwell, The

1979 Amendments to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-ConsumerProtection Act, in
Ch.A at 11 (1979);
Doggett, "How Much Does It Hurt?", supra note 8, at 7 (citing Senate floor debate on all
amendments of S.B. 357, at 24 (Apr. 10, 1979)).
116. See-Doggett, "How Much Does It Hurt?", supra note 8, at 7 (citing Senate floor
debate on all amendments of S.B. 357, at 24 (Apr. 10, 1979)).
STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS,
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section. 1 17 Although attorneys' fees are mandatorily recoverable under the

revised TDTPA,' 1 8 the amount recoverable is a question of fact."'
The consumer's burden of proof for recovery of attorneys' fees may be
eased by articles 2226 and 3737h of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, as
amended by the Sixty-sixth Texas Legislature." ° Article 2226 allows the
court discretion to take judicial notice of the reasonableness of usual and
customary attorneys' fees charged in certain instances."' Article 3737h
permits the court to consider an affidavit prepared by a party or his attorney reciting the reasonable and necessary nature of the amount billed
as sufficient evidence to show the necessity of the hours billed."'
E. Seller's Attorneys" Fees and Court Costs
In an attempt to discourage unfounded or harassing suits by consumers, the legislature amended the TDTPA's provision for attorneys' fees
and court costs recoverable by a seller."82 This subsection requires the
court mandatorily award attorneys' fees and court costs to a seller when
the consumer's suit is brought in bad faith or for purposes of harassment.14 This amendment may discourage a consumer from pursuing litigation if the seller tenders a reasonable settlement offer or if the
consumer's injuries are relatively minor with negligible tangible manifestations. Under such circumstances, if a consumer were to pursue litigation
he might be found guilty of acting in "bad faith," and find his recovery
off-set by the seller's cost of defending himself."26 Although mandatorily
117.- See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (Vernon Supp. 1980). Compare id.
§ 17.50 with 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, sec. 1, § 17.50, at 326.
118. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
119. See International Security Life Ins. Co. v. Spray, 468 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex. 1977);
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Licht, 544 S.W.2d 442, 445-46 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1976, no writ). See generally Bragg, Special Issues in Deceptive Trade Practices Cases, in
STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR GENERAL PRAcrImoNERs, Ch.C at 19, 20

(1979); Johns, 1979 Amendments to the Consumer ProtectionAct and Their Effect on Defenses, Attorney Fees, Limitations and Venue 11-13 (1979) (unpublished essay available
from the State Bar of Texas) [Hereinafter cited as Johns, 1979 Amendments and Their
Effect].
120. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 2226, 3737h (Vernon Supp. 1980).
121. See id. art. 2226.
122. See id. art. 3737h.
123. See Tx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
124. Compare id. § 17.50(c) with 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, sec. 1, § 17.50(c), at 327.
125. See Tx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon Supp. 1980); cf., e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 501.211(3) (West Supp. 1979) (consumer pursuing litigation may be required to

post bond in amount of defendant's costs to be forfeited if suit found to be frivilous or
harassing); GA. CODE ANN. § 106-1210(d) (Supp. 1979) (seller awarded attorneys' fees and
costs if consumer in bad faith rejects settlement offer and continues suit); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 49-15-8(B)(1) (Supp. 1975) (prevailing seller recovers attorneys' fees and costs if con-
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awarded when a consumer is found to be in "bad faith,""6 the seller's
attorneys' fees must still be substantiated by the seller as being
"reasona127
ble and necessary" in light of the attendant circumstances.
F. Notice: Offer of Settlement
The original TDTPA required an injured consumer give an intended
defendant notice of his complaint at least thirty days prior to the commencement of the suit.' s Although notice was a prerequisite to filing a
suit,129 the requirement was relatively unenforceable and ineffective. 8 0
Hence, the notice requirement was repealed in 1977181 and replaced by an
affirmative defense to exemplary damages. 18' When a seller could prove
he had not received any written notice prior to the filing of the suit, the
consumer's recovery was limited to his actual damages."'3 This defense to
treble damages encouraged consumers to comply with the "letter of the
law" and give notice. The defense provided little incentive, however, to
resolve the consumer's grievance outside the courtroom.1 3 ' The "notice"
provision merely required written notice prior to commencement of the
13
suit 35 by serving the defendant seller with the consumer's petition,
leaving the seller with little opportunity to make any attempt at
87
conciliation.
The notice provision was further amended in 1979 when the Sixty-sixth
Texas Legislature enacted a new "notice" section entitled "Notice: Offer
of Settlement.""38 Written notice is now an unconditional prerequisite to
filing an action under the TDTPA.' 8' In the absence of a bona fide exception, failure to comply with the requirements of this section will bar any

sumer's suit brought without merit). See generally Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice
Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 724, 748-49 (1972); Rothschild, A Guide to Georgia'sFairBusiness Practices Act of 1975, 10 GA. L. REV. 917, 925 (1976).
126. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
127. See id. § 17.50(c).
128. See 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, sec. 1, § 17.53, at 330.
129. See id.
130. See generally Hearing on S.B. 357, supra note 3, at 5-6; see also 1977 Tex. Gen.
Laws, ch. 216, sec. 12, at 605.
131. See 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 216, sec. 12, at 605. See generally Hearing on S.B.
357, supra note 3, at 5-6.
132. See 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 216, sec. 6, § 17.50A, at 604.
133. See id.
134. See Hearing on S.B. 357, supra note 3, at 5-6.
135. See 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 216, sec. 6, § 17.50A(2), at 604.
136. See id.
137. See Hearing on S.B. 357, supra note 3, at 5-6.
138. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50A (Vernon Supp. 1980).
139. See id. § 17.50A(a).
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recovery under the Act. 40 The new notice section prescribes the manner
in which a consumer must serve a prospective defendant with notice, and
establishes a detailed procedure to be followed."" Written notice142 advising the seller of the consumer's specific complaint1 41 must be given at
least thirty days prior to filing suit.14 4 The notice must describe the
amount of actual damages sustained by the consumer, as well as the
amount of any attorneys' fees reasonably incurred in asserting the
claim. 4 5 Compliance with these standards can be waived only if giving
notice thirty days prior to filing suit would exceed the statute of limitations, 46 or if the consumer is merely asserting a counterclaim." 47 In effect
the new notice section provides a detailed method for negotiation of consumer claims outside the courtroom"4 because the required notice provides an alleged wrongdoer with sufficient opportunity and information to
decide whether to settle or to go to court. A seller is also provided with
details about the type of injury sustained
and the amount necessary to
4
make the consumer whole again."

9

Upon receipt of written notice the seller may, within thirty days, tender
a written offer of settlement.8 0 This offer must include an agreement to
reimburse the consumer for any reasonable attorneys' fees incurred.' 1'
The offer, however, does not have to equal the amount demanded by or
deemed reasonable by the consumer.85 If the consumer's demand is reasonable it would be to the seller's advantage in most cases to tender a
comparable settlement offer. By offering the consumer substantially what
he demanded, the seller may achieve an out of court settlement, thereby
avoiding any treble damage assessments. Even if a settlement is not
reached, the seller has demonstrated his good faith for purposes of any
subsequent litigation.
Failure of the consumer to respond within thirty days constitutes a re-

140. See id. § 17.50A(a).
141. See id. § 17.50A.
142. See id. § 17.50A.
143. See id. § 17.50A(a).
144. See id. § 17.50A(a).
145. See id. § 17.50A(a).
146. See id. § 17.50A(b).
147. See id. § 17.50A(b).
148. See Senate Bill 357-Legislative Intent 1, 3 (1979) (unpublished transcript on file
with Sen. Bill Meier's Office, Capitol Station, Austin, Texas) (sections "B" and "5" set out
pertinent legislative intent of S.B. 357); O'Gorman, Omnibus Clause and Settlement Procedure, supra note 6, at 2.
149. See Txx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50A(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).

150. See id. § 17.50A(c).
151. See id. § 17.50A(c).
152. See id. § 17.50A(c).
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jection ss and may be filed with the court. 154 If the trier of fact finds the
amount offered to be the same or substantially the same as the actual
damages suffered, the court will limit the consumer's recovery to the
lesser of his actual damages or the amount of the settlement offer. 55 It
should be noted that under such circumstances a consumer probably
would not be entitled to recover any attorneys' fees incurred subsequent
to the rejection because they are not part of his actual damages.15 1 A finding by a court favorable to the seller's offer constitutes a judicial determination of the offer's "reasonableness." '15 7 A consumer's continued pursuit
of litigation after rejecting the offer may be viewed as harassment or bad
faith."$8
These newly enacted procedures for notice and settlement give some
bargaining power back to sellers accused of violating the TDTPA. By requiring compliance with this section as a prerequisite to filing a suit, the
1979 amendments may have given sellers sufficient leverage to encourage
out of court settlements. 159 Achieving such settlements would serve to reduce overcrowded dockets, while allowing unwitting sellers to avoid harsh
treble damages for unintentional mistakes. These settlements would also
serve to make the injured consumer whole again, thereby fulfilling one of
the primary goals of the TDTPA.

153. See id. § 17.50A(c).
154. See id. § 17.50A(d). The seller must file an affidavit with the court, accompanied
by a copy of the settlement offer, certifying its rejection by the consumer. Id. § 17.50A(d).
155. Id. § 17.50A(d).
156. In 1979, the legislature specifically separated the recovery of actual damages and
attorneys' fees. See id. § 17.50(b)(1), (d); cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 106-1210(d) (Supp. 1979)
(court shall deny attorneys' fees incurred after properly tendered settlement offer rejected).
See also Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 724, 749
(1972); Rothschild, A Guide To Georgia's Fair Business Practices Act of 1975, 10 GA. L.
REV. 917, 924-25 (1976).
157. Cf. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50A(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (evidence of
settlement offer introduced only to determine its reasonableness).
158. Compare id. § 17.50(c) (seller awarded "reasonable and necessary" attorneys' fees
if consumer's suit groundless or in bad faith) with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.211(3) (West Supp.
1979) (consumer pursuing litigation may be required to post bond in amount of defendant's
costs, to be forfeited if suit found to be frivolous or harassing) and GA. CODE ANN. § 1061210(d) (Supp. 1979) (seller awarded attorneys' fees and costs if consumer rejects settlement
offer in bad faith and continues suit) and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-15-8(B)(1) (Supp. 1975)
(prevailing seller recovers attorneys' fees and costs if consumer suit brought without merit).
See also Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 724, 749
(1972); Rothschild, A Guide to Georgia's Fair Business Practices Act of 1975, 10 GA. L.
REV. 917, 925 (1976).

159. Out of court settlements are intended to allow an honest seller ap opportunity to
correct his error and make good the parties' bargain. See Hearing on S.B. 357, supra note 3,
at 4-6.
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G. Defenses
The "bona fide error" defense, limiting a consumer's recovery to actual
damages, was eliminated by the 1979 amendments to the TDTPA.16 0 The
1979 revision also repealed defenses made available to sellers who were
neither given a reasonable opportunity to cure an alleged defect nor given
any notice of the consumer's complaint prior to the suit.'

The repealed

defenses are replaced by two affirmative defenses constituting absolute
bars to any recovery of damages by the consumer: 1"2the "third party reliance" defense16 3 and the "absolute tender" defense. ' "
To assert the "third party reliance" defense sucessfully, a seller must
prove he provided the consumer with written notice of his reliance upon
written information from a third party.165 This notice must have been
given to the consumer before the sale was completed. 66 The seller also
has the burden of proving the information relied upon by both parties
was a "producing cause" of the consumer's injuries. 1 7 Finally, the seller
must prove his reliance was, in fact, reasonable.'"8 Establishing his own
reliance is necessary because the mere fact the written information was a
"producing cause" of the consumer's injuries will not automatically bar
all possible recovery against the seller. 69 When a seller's conduct reveals
he knew or should have known the information was inaccurate, the con-

160. Compare TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50B (Vernon Supp. 1980) with 1977
Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 216, sec. 6, § 17.50A(1), at 604.
161. Compare Tax. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1980) with
1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 216, sec. 6, § 17.50A(1), (2), at 604.
162. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50B (Vernon Supp. 1980).
163. See id. § 17.50B(a). "Third party reliance" means the seller was relying upon written information from the government or the product's manufacturer for the representations
supplied to the buyer. Id. § 17.50B(a). See generally Johns, 1979 Amendments and Their
Effect, supra note 119, at 1-2.
164. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50B(d) (Vernon Supp. 1980). In Baucum v.
Great Am. Ins. Co., the Texas Supreme Court defined a valid tender to be "an unconditional offer ...

to pay ....

in current coin of the realm, a sum not less ...

than [the

amount] due on a specified debt or obligation." Baucum v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 370 S.W.2d
863, 866 (Tex. 1963); see Home Ins. Indem. Co. v. Gutierrez, 409 S.W.2d 450, 454, 456 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The Gutierrez court ruled that payment
by check is not a payment "in current coin of the realm." The court concluded: "[ajlthough
the delivery to .

.

. [and] .

.

. acceptance by the creditor of the debtor's check is often

treated, for convenience, as the passage of money, it is not payment." Home Ins. Indem. Co.
v. Gutierrez, 409 S.W.2d 450, 456 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
165. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50B(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
166. See id.
167. See id. § 17.50B(b).
168. See id. § 17.50B(a), (b).
169. See id. § 17.50B(b).
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sumer will still be entitled to recover damages from the seller. " "
A second defense available to a seller is the "absolute tender" of damages demanded. M To plead this defense successfully the seller must
prove he tendered to the consumer the full amount of damages demanded
within thirty days of receiving written notice of the complaint.17 2 The
"tender" required is not a written tender of offer to settle; rather, it is an
absolute tender in cash of the full amount of damages demanded.17 8 The
amount tendered must include any expenses claimed by the consumer,
such as reasonable attorneys' fees incurred to assert the demand.17 4 Proof
of such a tender by the seller will bar any further legal remedies pursued
by a consumer.176
The TDTPA's new "damages" section7 6 also allows filing of a suit
against a third party who supplied a seller with false or inaccurate information when the third party knew or should have known the information
would be provided to a consumer.1 77 The consumer may maintain a third
party suit because the Act specifically recites that "privity" is not a material issue.' 78 The applicability of the remedy is more narrow in scope,
however, than the actual defense itself.1 79 The section expressly provides
that the third party action is available in suits only when the "third party
reliance" defense involves written information supplied by a non-govern-

170. See id. § 17.50B(a), (b).
171. See id. § 17.50B(d).
172. See id. § 17.50B(d).
173. See id. § 17.50B(d) (requiring cash tender of full amount demanded); cf. Baucum
v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 370 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. 1963) (tender of full amount "in current
coin of the realm" required). Compare TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.50A(c) (Vernon
Supp. 1980) (tendering written offer of settlement sufficient) with id. § 17.50B(d) (cash
tender of full amount required).
174. See id. § 17.50B(d).
175. See id. § 17.50B(d). Section 17.50B(d) is silent concerning the consequences that
follow a consumer's rejection of the seller's attempted tender. The courts must now decide
whether such a rejection would bar any further recovery by the consumer. When a consumer
has rejected a tender of the amount he demanded, the court should limit the consumer's
recovery to the lesser of the amount tendered or a reasonable amount as determined by the
court. Cf. id. § 17.50A(d) (rejected reasonable settlement offer limits consumer's recovery to
lesser of offer or amount found reasonable by court). Additionally, the court should award
the defendant his "reasonable and necessary" attorneys' fees and court costs incurred in his
defense after the consumer rejected seller's cash tender. Cf. id. § 17.50(c) (seller awarded
fees and costs of defense if consumer's suit in "bad faith" or for harassment purposes).
176. See id. § 17.50B.
177. See id. § 17.50B(c).
178. See id.§ 17.50B(c). Suit may be filed against the "third party" when a "third
party reliance" defense has been raised, provided no double recovery is possible. Id. §
17.50B(c).
179. Compare id. § 17.50B(a)(1), (2), (3) with id. § 17.50B(c).
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mental source.180 A simple explanation for this limitation upon the subsection's application can be found in the doctrine of sovereign immunity,"" which precludes the commencement
of any suit against a
1
government body without its consent. 82
H. Limitation and Venue
The legislature also addressed the issues of a statute of limitations and
venue when it revised the TDTPA. The idea of a specific statute of limitations for actions brought under the TDTPA is new to the Act.188 Prior
to 1979, the lack of an express statute of limitation required claimants
look to Texas' two general statutes of limitation. " Depending upon
whether the cause of action arose in tort or contract, the claimant would
look to the two or four year general limitation statute. 88 Under the revised TDTPA, however, all causes of action must now be brought within
two years of the occurrence of the deceptive act or practice.1 86 In the case
of a latent injury, the Act allows a cause of action to be brought within
two years of the time the injury is discovered or should
have been discov187
ered through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
The major change to the TDTPA's venue section 8 8 is the deletion of a
provision allowing a seller to be sued in any county in which the seller has
conducted business in the past, regardless of whether he still conducts
business in that county when suit is instituted. 8 1 A consumer may file
suit in the county where the seller resides or maintains his principle place
of business. 19" For causes of action arising after August 27, 1979, a consumer may sue a seller in any county in Texas in which the seller has a
fixed and established place of business at the time the suit is instituted,1''
or in the county the deceptive act or practice occurred or was solicited by

180. See id. § 17.50B(c).
181. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976) (Federal Tort Claims Act) with TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1980) (Texas Tort Claims Act). See generally
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 970-78 (4th ed. 1971).
182. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 971 (4th ed. 1971).
183. Compare 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, sec. 1, at 322 with Tax. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 17.56A (Vernon Supp. 1980).
184. See TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (actions to be commenced within two years); id. art. 5527 (actions barred in four years).
185. See id. arts. 5526, 5527.
186. See Tzx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.56A (Vernon Supp. 1980).
187. See id.
188. See id. § 17.56.
189. Compare id. § 17.56 with 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 216, sec. 8, § 17.56, at 604.
190. See Tix. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.56 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
191. See id.
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the seller or his authorized agent.1" '
III.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act is to eliminate
fraud in the Texas marketplace. 1"s The Act is designed to protect Texas
consumers, not to punish sellers who have committed only unintentional
mistakes. The original TDTPA, although considered effective in deterring
deceptive practices with its harsh treble damages, did not make a distinction between a seller's innocent error and his culpable misconduct.10 4 As a
result, the Act's punitive damages threatened both honest and dishonest
sellers.
The key elements of the 1979 revisions are the new "absolute" defenses, stricter notice and settlement procedures, and limitations upon a
seller's liability."95 The interpretations given to these protective mechanisms by Texas courts will determine whether the Act's purpose and the
legislature's intent in making the revisions will be fulfilled. The legislature's intention in enacting the 1979 amendments neither inhibits a consumer's ability to recover compensatory damages,196 nor detracts from the
rights and remedies afforded Texas consumers against unscrupulous
members of the marketplace.197
Unquestionably the new Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act provides
greater protection for honest sellers. The Act is, however, fundamentally
a consumer protection act and should be liberally construed in favor of
injured consumers. The protection provided honest sellers is affirmative
in nature and should be afforded only sellers who have demonstrated
their conduct was unintentional. The courts, therefore, should be reserved
in the manner in which they extend this protection.
When construing the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the welfare
of the injured consumer should be the court's primary concern. The fact a
seller is blameless in his conduct neither absolves him of the guilt for
having caused the consumer's injury, nor removes his obligation to make
the consumer whole again. The consumer is the injured party, regardless
of whether the seller acted intentionally or mistakenly. The consumer,
therefore, must be afforded the greatest protection under the Act by the

192. See id.
193.
194.
143, sec.
195.
1980).
196.
197.

See
See
1, §
See

id. § 17.44.
Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 671 (Tex. 1977); 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch.
17.50(b)(1), at 326.
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.50(b)(1), 17.50A, 17.50B (Vernon Supp.

See id. § 17.50(b)(1).
See id. § 17.50(b)(1).
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courts. The protections made available to a seller by the 1979 amendments to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act must be kept in proper
perspective. Failure to maintain such a perspective will create an imbalance in the Act that could defeat its fundamental purpose. A misinterpretation of the Act's purpose would render the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act a "Consumer Destruction" rather than a "Consumer Protection" act.198

198. Cf. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934) (concept of fairness discussed). Justice Cardozo stated: "[blut justice, though due to the accused, is due to the
accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament.
We are to keep the balance true." Id. at 122.
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